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OPTIMAL REGULATORY AREAS FOR 
SECURITIES DISCLOSURE 
MERRITT B. FOX* 
INTRODUCTION 
The corporate governance scandals of 2003 have brought renewed 
focus on mandatory disclosure. One of the most fundamental questions 
relating to this kind of regulation is the choice of regulatory area. The 
United States initially faced this question in the 1930s when, after intense 
debate, it decided to move from an exclusively state-based system to one 
primarily relying on federal regulation. It is a hot issue today as well. The 
countries of Europe, for example, are currently deciding the extent to 
which the European Community, rather than its member states, should 
determine securities disclosure in Europe.1 Canada is deciding whether to 
follow the path taken by Australia in the 1980s and to enlarge the role of 
the federal government in a system that has traditionally left disclosure 
regulation primarily to the provinces.2 Also, advocates of issuer choice are 
urging the United States to reconsider its 1930s decision and to give 
issuers the option to choose among a reinvigorated set of state regulatory 
regimes.3 The issuer-choice school of thought is influencing the debates in 
 
 
 * Michael E. Patterson Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; B.A. 1968, J.D. 1976, Ph.D. 
(Economics) 1980, Yale University. The author wishes to thank the participants in the 2003 F. Hodge 
O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium at Washington University School of Law, and in 
particular James Casteliano, Professor Hillary Sale, and Professor Murray Weidenbaum, for their 
helpful comments on this Article. 
 1. See, e.g., COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON 
THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (Feb. 15,  2001) (the “Lamfalussy Report”); 
NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 29-32 (2002). 
 2. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Regulation of Securities in Canada, 
17 ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION BULLETIN 4401 (1994); Minister Throne, Speech at the 
Canadian House of Commons, House of Common Debates (Feb. 27, 1996); Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, A 
National Securities Exchange for Canada?, in REFORMING THE CANADIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR: 
CANADA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 185 (Thomas Courchene & Edwin Neave eds., 1997). An excellent 
review of both past reform proposals and the current state of the debate can be found in A. Douglas 
Harris, A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or Nationalization? 
(University of Toronto Capital Markets Institute, White Paper) (Oct. 2002), at 
http://www.cfie.ca/en/pdf/WhitePaper_Oct8-02.pdf [hereinafter Harris]. Canada has periodically faced 
this question over the last several decades. ROYAL COMMISSION ON BANKING AND FINANCE, PORTER 
COMMISSION REPORT 561 (1964) (the “Porter Report”); CANSEC: Legal and Administrative Concepts, 
ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION BULLETIN 61 (Nov. 1967), cited in Harris, supra, at 12 n.18. 
 3. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International 
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman]; Roberta 
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 
(1998) [hereinafter Empowering Investors]; Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in 
International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 387 (2001) [hereinafter Need for 
Competition]. 
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Europe and Canada as well.4 Finally, other advocates are pushing for a 
move in the opposite direction, arguing that standards for issuer disclosure 
should be set at a global level.5 
This Article constructs an economic-efficiency based theory of optimal 
regulatory areas for securities disclosure. While larger political and 
constitutional considerations unrelated to efficiency will inevitably also 
play a role in the resolution of the debates recounted above, efficiency 
considerations are important because they go to the capacity of capital 
markets to promote the generation of real wealth. The theory developed 
here can help identify the efficiency-related tradeoffs involved in choosing 
one level of government versus another and the information that is needed 
to choose intelligently. 
The optimal structure of disclosure regulation over the world’s issuers 
is determined by the answers to two questions: (1) With respect to any 
point on earth, what level of government, out of all the levels that have 
control over the point, should be the one regulating disclosure? (2) Among 
all the units of government identified by the answer to the first question as 
the ones that should be engaging in disclosure regulation, which one or 
ones should regulate any given issuer? 
Because all governmental units existing in the world today have a 
territorial base, answering the first question—the level of government to 
regulate securities disclosure—involves dividing the globe territorially, 
either more or less finely. What distinguishes one governmental unit from 
 
 
 4. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 2, at 84-86. 
 5. See, e.g., Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the 
Global Market, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 241 (1997); Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, 
Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and 
Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 207, 261-65 (1999) [hereinafter Steinberg & Michaels] (the world’s 
countries, by self selection, would be divided into three groups—developed market, semi-developed 
market, and emerging market—and each group would work out uniform disclosure rules for its 
countries’ issuers that would permit the sale and trade of their securities anywhere within the group). 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), a worldwide organization of 
countries that provides a forum for meetings of the securities regulators of member states, initially 
undertook a straddle in which it urged countries either to adopt uniform rules (international 
uniformity) or reciprocity (essentially the issuer nationality approach). INTERNATIONAL EQUITY 
OFFERS, REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF IOSCO 75 (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter TECHNICAL 
COMMITTEE REPORT]. IOSCO, in cooperation with the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(the “IASC”), is now seeking to develop a recommended set of international accounting standards and 
has developed a set of non-financial disclosure standards that could be used in a single uniform 
disclosure document for cross-border offerings. Thus, IOSCO has tilted toward international 
uniformity as the preferred result. See TECHNICAL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra. See also Michel V. 
Hurley, International and Debt and Equity Markets: U.S. Participation in the Globalization Trend, 8 
EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 701, 733 (1994); Steinberg & Michaels, supra, at 241, 243-46; Roberta S. 
Karmel, The IOSCO Venice Conference, NEW YORK L.J., Oct. 19, 1989, at 3.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/3
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another is the territory associated with it. Thus, the answer to the second 
question—which governmental unit or units at the chosen level regulates 
any given issuer—is going to depend on the issuer’s ties to the chosen 
unit’s territory. Potentially relevant territorial ties include: where the issuer 
is located (“issuer location”), where its securities are being offered or 
traded (“transaction location”), and where the purchasers or traders of the 
issuer’s shares reside (“investor location”). Alternatively, as the issuer 
choice proposals suggest, the determination of which governmental unit 
regulates an issuer could be made to depend solely on the issuer’s own 
consent. 
In prior writing, I have taken the answer to the first question—the level 
of government—as given. I have instead primarily focused on the second 
question—what kind of a tie an issuer needs to have to a territory to justify 
regulation of the issuer’s disclosure by the government associated with the 
territory.6 For example, I have assumed that for the United States, the 
proper level of government to be regulating securities disclosure is the one 
governing the territory of the nation as a whole. Given this assumption, I 
concluded that issuer location—the place where an issuer has its economic 
center of gravity as a firm—should be the territorial tie that triggers 
application of the U.S. regime to an issuer.7 Thus, the U.S. government 
should regulate the disclosure of all issuers located in the United States, 
and no others, except those who consent to U.S. regulation. The place or 
places where an issuer’s securities are being offered or traded, and the 
place or places where the purchasers or traders in the issuers’ shares 
reside, should, in my view, be irrelevant. 
In contrast, the primary focus of this Article is the proper level of 
government needed to regulate securities disclosure in a world with a high 
degree of international capital mobility. Part I briefly reviews the role of 
issuer disclosure in promoting economic efficiency and demonstrates that 
each issuer has a socially optimal level of disclosure. Part II identifies a 
regulatory structure for disclosure by the world’s issuers as having two 
 
 
 6. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate 
Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997) [hereinafter Disclosure in a Globalizing Market]; Merritt B. 
Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for 
Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696 (1998) [hereinafter Political Economy]; Merritt B. Fox, Retaining 
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 
1335 (1999) [hereinafter Retaining Mandatory Disclosure]; Merritt B. Fox, The Securities 
Globalization Disclosure Debate, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 567 (2000) [hereinafter Disclosure Debate]; 
Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 563 (2001) [hereinafter 
Issuer Choice Debate]. 
 7. Political Economy, supra note 6, at 730-57. 
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components: a division of the world into a set of areas and a rule of 
territorial tie that assigns issuers to these different areas for regulation by 
their respective governmental units. I suggest that the optimal world 
regulatory structure is the one that pairs issuers and governmental units in 
such a way that for each issuer, the persons who would ultimately benefit 
from the issuer being well regulated have residences that are, to the 
greatest extent possible, concentrated within the area of the regulating 
governmental unit.  
Part III considers an ideal world conforming to assumptions that permit 
its division into geographic areas where there is very little economic 
integration across territorial lines except portfolio investment capital 
flows. I show that this division of the world, combined with an issuer 
location rule of territorial tie, results in an optimal regulatory structure. 
Use of an investor location or transaction location rule of territorial tie is 
shown to result in regulatory structures less conducive to efficiency, as is 
also the case with issuer choice.  
Part IV considers the implications of the real-world breakdown in the 
assumptions relating to each area that are used to construct Part III’s ideal 
world. Part III’s ideal world is built upon two sets of assumptions. One set 
is that most trade occurs within the area, that labor and entrepreneurs have 
low mobility across territorial lines, and that all issuers operating within 
the area have their economic centers of gravity there. The second set is 
that the governmental unit associated with the area is responsive to the 
needs of its residents and capable of effective application and enforcement 
of its rules and that all issuers within the area have the same optimal level 
of disclosure. Taking the political subdivisions present in the real world, 
the first set of assumptions could only be met perfectly if the world is a 
single large regulatory area. The second set of assumptions could only be 
met, even approximately, if much smaller regulatory areas were employed. 
The discussion helps identify where the optimal point of tradeoff is 
between the advantages of larger sized areas and the advantages of smaller 
sized areas under various circumstances prevailing in different parts of the 
world. The breakdown in assumptions is shown not to resurrect the case 
for using investor location or transaction location as the rule for territorial 
tie or the case for adopting issuer choice. 
Part V concludes the Article by sketching how the overall analysis can 
be applied to current debates. It suggests that the United States should 
maintain its nationally based system of regulation and that Canada should 
move from a provincially based system to a nationally based one. It finds 
that, for the European Community, the choice between Community-level 
disclosure regulation and national regulation is a close one. Considerable 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/3
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problems are found with proposals for regulation by some kind of global 
disclosure authority. 
I. ISSUER DISCLOSURE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
The purpose of this Article is to construct an economic-efficiency-
based theory of optimal regulatory areas for issuer disclosure. The 
necessary starting point is an efficiency analysis of issuer disclosure in 
general. This analysis arises from the observation that disclosure has both 
social benefits and social costs.8 
A. Social Benefits and Social Costs of Disclosure 
1. Benefits 
An act of disclosure by an issuer produces social benefits by improving 
how proposed new investment projects in the real economy are selected 
for implementation and how existing projects are operated.  
a. Benefits from Effects on Issuer’s Own Behavior 
Consider first the social benefits derived from an act of disclosure’s 
effects on the issuer’s own behavior. The disclosure produces these 
benefits directly when the issuer contemplates implementing a new project 
by means of a new offering of stock. Because of the disclosure-induced 
increase in the accuracy of the price at which the shares will be sold, the 
firm’s cost of capital is brought more in line with the social cost of 
investing society’s scarce savings in the contemplated project, which 
increases the chances that the issuer will implement socially worthwhile 
projects and avoid socially unworthwhile projects.9 The disclosure 
produces benefits through a second route as well, unrelated to whether the 
issuer is offering new shares, by increasing the effectiveness of several of 
the devices that limit the extent to which managers of a public corporation 
place their own interests above those of their shareholders. Additional 
disclosure assists in the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise and 
 
 
 8. I have analyzed this question in more detail elsewhere. See Disclosure in a Globalizing 
Market, supra note 6, at 2544-50. See also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of 
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a 
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995).  
 9. See Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1358-63.  
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in shareholder enforcement of management’s fiduciary duties.10 It also 
increases the threat of hostile takeover when managers engage in non-
share-value-maximizing behavior. It does so both by making a takeover 
less risky for potential acquirers and by reducing the chance that a value-
enhancing acquisition will be deterred because the target has an 
inaccurately high share price. Finally, by reducing the risk associated with 
holding an issuer’s stock in a less than fully diversified portfolio, 
additional disclosure increases the use of share-price-based management 
compensation, which also helps align the interests of managers and 
shareholders.11  
b. Benefits from Effects on Behavior of Others 
Consider second how an issuer’s disclosure produces additional social 
benefits derived from its effects on the behavior of other issuers. 
Information about one issuer helps investors understand better the 
prospects and operations of other issuers as well, particularly the issuer’s 
competitors, major suppliers, and customers. As a result, capital allocation 
and managerial agency cost reduction are improved for these other issuers 
as well through the same mechanisms described just above.  
c. Social Benefits Exceed Private Benefits 
A plausible story can be told concerning how the benefits arising from 
the effects of the disclosure on the issuer’s own activities are captured by 
the issuer through a higher sale price when, at the time of the primary 
market sale of its shares, it makes a commitment to provide such 
information on an ongoing basis.12 The issuer will not, however, be able to 
capture the benefits arising from the effects of the disclosure on the 
behavior of other issuers because the prospect of such benefits will not 
make the disclosing issuer’s shares any more attractive in the market. 
Thus, the private benefits from an act of disclosure will be less than the 
social benefits.  
 
 
 10. See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, in COMPARATIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 701-718 (Klaus I. 
Hopt et al. eds., 1998). 
 11. See Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 6, at 2548-50. 
 12. See Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1365. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/3
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2. Costs 
An act of disclosure entails costs as well. An individual issuer’s 
disclosure involves two different kinds of costs, “operational” costs and 
“interfirm” costs. Operational costs are the out-of-pocket expenses and the 
diversions of management and staff time that issuers incur to provide the 
information. Interfirm costs arise from the fact that the information 
provided can put the issuer at a disadvantage relative to its competitors (by 
allowing them to compete more effectively) and to its major suppliers and 
major customers (by allowing them to bargain more effectively). The 
operational costs are the social costs of the issuer’s act of disclosure: they 
are costs both to the individual firm and to society as a whole. The 
interfirm costs are costs only to the individual firm. They are not social 
costs because the interfirm disadvantages to the issuer from the disclosure 
are counterbalanced by the advantages the disclosure confers on the other 
firms. Thus, at all levels of disclosure, an issuer’s private marginal costs 
will exceed its social marginal cost by an amount equal to these interfirm 
costs.13  
B. An Issuer’s Socially Optimal Level of Disclosure 
As a result of these benefits and costs, an issuer’s level of disclosure 
affects the real returns generated by both it and other issuers. An issuer’s 
socially optimal level of disclosure is the level at which the marginal 
social benefits just equal the marginal social costs.  
Issuers will not disclose at their optimal levels if we rely on market 
forces alone. Under such a regime, an issuer’s private benefits from 
disclosure will be less than its social benefits, and its private costs from 
disclosure will be greater than its social costs. Thus, each issuer will 
choose to disclose at a level below its social optimum.14 This market 
failure constitutes the key efficiency-based rationale for regulating issuer 
disclosure.15  
 
 
 13. I have considered this point in more detail elsewhere. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing 
Market, supra note 6, at 2537-39. See also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1490-91 (1992); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 
VA. L. REV. 717, 721-23 (1984); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 
61 BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995);  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure 
and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 672-73 (1984). 
 14. The analysis shows this conclusion to be true even if the issuer’s managers completely 
identify with existing shareholders and seek to maximize share value. 
 15. It is, of course, possible that because of governmental failure, the cure would be worse than 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. THE APPROACH TO DETERMINING OPTIMAL REGULATORY AREAS 
A regulatory structure for disclosure by the world’s issuers can be 
identified in terms of two components: a division of the world into a set of 
areas and a rule of territorial tie for assigning issuers to these different 
areas for regulation by their respective governmental units. Global 
economic welfare is maximized when each of the world’s issuers discloses 
at its socially optimal level. The goal therefore is a global regulatory 
structure in which each such issuer would be prompted to disclose as close 
as is cost effectively possible to its socially optimal level. Assume for now 
that governmental units are responsive to the needs of their residents. The 
regulatory structure that is likely to come closest to the goal is therefore 
one that pairs issuers and governmental units in such a way that for each 
issuer, the persons who would ultimately benefit from the issuer being 
well regulated—i.e., the persons who would be the ultimate beneficiaries 
of the greater real economic returns resulting from the issuer disclosing at 
its optimal level—have residences that are to the greatest extent possible 
concentrated within the regulating governmental unit’s area. 
Each of the world’s governmental units has associated with it a certain 
portion of the world’s territory. Thus, any particular global regulatory 
structure implies a particular set of regulatory areas. The optimal set of 
regulatory areas is the one that corresponds to the best global regulatory 
structure.  
III. OPTIMAL REGULATORY AREAS—THE IDEAL CASE  
A. The Starting Point 
It is easiest to see what each member of the optimal set of regulatory 
areas would look like by first considering an ideal case not found in the 
real world. This ideal case involves a division of the world into geographic 
areas where there is very little economic integration across territorial lines 
except in portfolio investment capital flows. More specifically, five 
assumptions apply to each regulatory area in this ideal case:  
1. Trade in goods and services with persons outside the area is a small 
percentage of the area’s gross domestic product (“GDP”).  
 
 
the disease, i.e., that governmental regulation would result in issuers disclosing at levels further from 
what is optimal than would reliance on market forces alone. This possibility does not eliminate the 
need to determine the optimal regulatory areas for securities disclosure. With respect to each of the 
world’s issuers, we still need to determine what governmental unit should make the determination that 
governmental failure would exceed market failure. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/3
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2. Labor and entrepreneurs residing within the area have little mobility 
across the lines separating this area from the rest of the world.  
3. The governmental unit associated with the area is responsive to the 
needs of the residents of the area and is capable of effective application 
and enforcement of its rules.  
4. Each issuer that has any real economic activities in the area is 
“located” in the area, which means that its economic center of gravity as a 
firm is located within the area. There are thus no multinational enterprises 
operating within the area. Indicators of an issuer’s economic center of 
gravity would include where the issuer’s headquarters are located, where it 
has its greatest concentration of physical capital and employees, and where 
its entrepreneurs resided at the time of the firm’s founding.16 Each issuer 
operating in the area would therefore be combining factors of production 
located primarily within the area to create goods and services that are 
primarily consumed within the area. 
5. Each issuer located within the area would be sufficiently similar in 
its corporate governance structure that it would have the same socially 
optimal level of disclosure.  
It is possible, however, for the shares of each of these issuers to be 
offered to investors residing outside the area or to be traded among 
investors residing outside the area or traded on exchanges located outside 
the area. Thus, portfolio capital flows are global, but real economic 
activity is local to the area. 
Part IV considers what the real world breakdown of these five 
assumptions would imply. 
B. The Governmental Unit as Exclusive Regulator of Issuers Located in 
the Area  
In this ideal case, a regulatory incidence analysis strongly suggests that 
the level of government that corresponds to the unit associated with each 
of these areas should be the exclusive regulator of the disclosure of all 
issuers located in the area. We will see below that with this pairing of 
issuers and governmental units, the ultimate beneficiaries of good 
regulation by any given regulating governmental unit will be primarily 
persons residing within its area. Thus, given the assumption that each 
governmental unit is responsive to the needs of the residents of its 
 
 
 16. The issuer’s jurisdiction of incorporation would not be a primary indicator.  
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territory, this subdivision of the world, combined with an issuer location 
rule of territorial tie, involves the optimal regulatory structure. 
The first step in seeing why this pairing of issuers and governmental 
units appropriately concentrates the benefits of good regulation, recall that, 
through its effects on capital allocation and the agency costs of 
management, an issuer’s level of disclosure can enhance the real returns 
generated by both it and its competitors, major suppliers, and major 
customers.17 An issuer discloses at its optimal level when its disclosure’s 
enhancement of these returns equals, at the margin, the disclosure’s 
marginal social cost. Because of the assumption of little trade outside the 
area, we know that all the competitors, major suppliers, and major 
customers of each issuer in the area will also be located in the area. Thus, 
if the governmental unit regulates in a way that prompts all the issuers 
located in the area to disclose at their socially optimal levels, the aggregate 
disclosure-induced net enhancement to the real returns generated by the 
area’s capital-utilizing enterprises would be maximized. There would be 
no enhancement of the real returns generated by issuers located in any 
other area, and the disclosure levels of the issuers in all the other areas 
would have no effect on this area’s issuer returns. 
This observation, however, does not complete the inquiry because a 
regulatory incidence analysis requires a determination of who are the 
ultimate beneficiaries from these enhanced returns. Analysis shows that it 
is not the investors in the area’s issuers, who may or may not be residents 
of the area. Rather it is labor and entrepreneurs associated with the area’s 
issuers, who do reside in the area. 
1. Investors Are Not The Ultimate Beneficiaries 
In an efficient market, an issuer’s share price takes into account the 
effect on the issuer’s future expected cash flow from the particular 
disclosure rules imposed on the issuer and on its competitors, major 
customers, and major suppliers. At the same time, if capital is relatively 
mobile internationally, competitive forces push capital toward receiving a 
single global expected rate of return (adjusted for risk). As a result, 
investors in all the world’s issuers tend to get the same risk-adjusted 
expected return even though issuer disclosure practices may vary widely 
from one regulatory area to another. Thus, investors in issuers located in 
 
 
 17. See supra Part I.A. 
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any given regulatory area will not receive any better returns whether 
issuers located in the area disclose at their optimal level or not.18 
2. Entrepreneurs and Labor Residing in the Area Are the Ultimate 
Beneficiaries 
The higher returns that result from an area’s issuers disclosing at their 
optimal level are real and must, of course, go to someone. Where they go 
is largely to the suppliers of the issuers’ less mobile factors of production. 
These are the area’s entrepreneurs, who will get higher prices when they 
sell shares in the firms they founded, and labor, who are likely to enjoy 
higher wages in an economy where capital is allocated and used 
efficiently. Thus, the persons in the world who primarily benefit from 
higher real returns when the areas issuers disclose at their optimal level are 
the area’s entrepreneurial talent and labor, who are residents of the area, 
not the investors in these issuers, who may live elsewhere.19 
C. The Inappropriateness of Investor Location as a Territorial Tie 
In the ideal case, it is easy to see why investor location would be an 
inappropriate alternative to issuer location as a rule of territorial tie. 
Governmental units outside any given regulatory area should not attempt 
 
 
 18. But see infra notes 19 and 25. 
 19. If the area’s issuers represent only a small portion of all equities available to investors in the 
world, investors would share in none of these gains. The area would be analogous to a single small 
firm in a perfectly competitive industry. Such a firm’s level of production has no effect on price. 
Following this analogy, what the area produces are investment opportunities—dollars of future 
expected cash flow—just like the firm produces products. A disclosure improvement’s positive effects 
on managerial motivation and choice of real investment projects will increase the number of dollars of 
future expected cash flow that the country has to sell. This benefits the entrepreneurs, who are selling 
the cash flow, and labor, who gain from the overall increase in the area’s economic efficiency. See 
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 6, at 2561-69. Because the area is like a small firm, 
however, the increase in the amount supplied is not great enough to lower the price at which a dollar of 
future expected cash flow is sold. Thus there is no benefit to investors, the “buyers” of these dollars of 
expected future cash flow. 
 If the area’s issuers represent a substantial portion of all equities available to investors in the 
world, as is the case with the United States, investors will share in some of these gains. A disclosure 
improvement’s increase in the number of dollars of future expected cash flow that the area has to offer 
would be great enough to lower the price at which a dollar of future expected cash flow is sold, at least 
slightly. Thus, all investors would gain from the improvement. This is equally true of investors from 
outside the area as for ones within the area and equally true for investors in issuers located within the 
area as for investors in issuers located outside the area. Furthermore, it is equally true of disclosure 
improvements of issuers located within the area whose shares are primarily sold to, or traded among, 
only foreign investors as it is of issuers located within the area primarily with investors residing in the 
area. For more detailed discussions of these points, see id. at 2552-80; Political Economy, supra note 
6, at 732-39. 
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to regulate the disclosure of issuers located within this area even if the 
securities are sold to, or traded among, residents of the territories governed 
by these other units. This is because the disclosure level of issuers located 
within the area does not affect the welfare of residents of the territories 
governed by these other governmental units. For the same reasons, the 
government associated with the area should not attempt to regulate the 
disclosure level of issuers located outside the area even when the shares of 
these issuers are sold to, or traded among, residents of this area. 
This rejection of investor location as a rule of territorial tie would 
appear to ignore another claimed benefit of mandatory disclosure—
investor protection—which will be concentrated where an issuer’s 
investors are concentrated. Investor protection, however, is not a sound 
justification for mandatory disclosure: disclosure is not necessary to 
protect investors against either unfair prices or risk. Consider first unfair 
prices. Under the efficient capital market hypothesis, securities prices are 
unbiased whether there is a great deal of information available about an 
issuer or very little. In other words, share prices will on average equal the 
actual value of the shares involved whether issuers are required to produce 
a lot of disclosure or only a little. Thus, greater disclosure is not necessary 
to protect investors from buying their shares at prices that are, on average, 
unfair, i.e., greater than their actual values. Now consider risk. With less 
information available about an issuer, share price, while still unbiased, is 
less accurate, i.e., it is more likely to be significantly off one way or the 
other from the share’s actual value. For an investor with a less than fully 
diversified portfolio, less share price accuracy can make the portfolio more 
risky. High quality disclosure would, to some extent, protect such an 
investor by reducing this risk. The investor, however, can protect herself 
much more effectively, and at less social cost, by simply diversifying 
more.20 
D. The Inappropriateness of Transaction Location as a Territorial Tie 
The location of transactions in an issuer’s shares is also an 
inappropriate rule of territorial tie. The analysis above shows that 
transaction location is irrelevant to where the benefits and costs of the 
issuer’s disclosure practices are felt. Thus, governmental units outside any 
 
 
 20. In portfolio theory terms, issuer disclosure reduces firm-specific (“unsystematic”) risk. Firm-
specific risk can be completely eliminated by sufficient diversification. See Barbara A. Banoff, 
Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 135 (1984).  
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given regulatory area should not attempt to regulate the disclosure of 
issuers located within the area even if the issuers’ securities are traded on 
exchanges located in territories governed by these other outside 
governmental units. Likewise, the area’s government should not attempt to 
regulate the disclosure level of issuers located outside the area even when 
the shares of these issuers are traded on an exchange located within the 
area.  
E. The Inappropriateness of Issuer Choice 
Finally, the analysis above shows that issuer choice, which eliminates 
any territorial tie at all, is inappropriate as well.21 Under issuer choice, as 
proposed by both Professor Romano and by Professors Choi and Guzman, 
each issuer in the world could choose whichever regulatory area’s 
disclosure regime it wished.22 Romano argues that issuer choice would 
lead to jurisdictions competing to offer issuers regulations that maximize 
share value.23 Choi and Guzman argue that it would lead to a diversity of 
available regimes and permit each issuer to select the one best suited to its 
particular needs.24 Neither argument, however, adequately takes account of 
the fact that issuer choice would result in each issuer selecting a regime 
requiring it to disclose at less than its socially optimal level. This is 
because each issuer will make its choice based on its calculations of the 
private benefits and costs that would arise from complying with each 
area’s required level of disclosure. As we have seen, an issuer’s private 
costs of disclosure exceed the social costs of disclosure, while its private 
benefits are less than the social benefits. Under the standard assumption 
that marginal costs rise and marginal benefits decline, the level of 
disclosure at which the marginal private benefits equal the marginal 
private costs is, therefore, lower than the socially optimal level, which is 
the level at which marginal social costs equal marginal social benefits. 
Given this market failure, using an issuer location territorial tie will 
lead to greater global economic efficiency than issuer choice unless the 
regulations adopted by the selected governmental units cause issuers to 
deviate even more (just in the opposite direction) from their optimal 
 
 
 21. I have previously written extensively on the question of issuer choice. See Retaining 
Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6; Issuer Choice Debate, supra note 6. I will accordingly keep my 
remarks here brief. Professor Romano’s reactions to these writings can be found in Need for 
Competition, supra note 3. 
 22. Empowering Investors, supra note 3, at 2361-62; Choi & Guzman, supra note 3, at 907. 
 23. Empowering Investors, supra note 3, at 2362. 
 24. Choi & Guzman, supra note 3, at 916-17. 
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disclosure levels than would issuer choice. Such suboptimal regulation is 
unlikely given our assumptions. The analysis above shows that the persons 
who benefit from the good regulation of the disclosure of issuers located 
in an area are concentrated in that area. And the governmental unit 
undertaking this regulation is assumed to be responsive to the needs of its 
residents. 
F. Conclusion 
In sum, if the world were divided into areas resembling the ideal case 
above and each issuer’s disclosure was regulated exclusively by the 
governmental unit associated with the area in which the issuer was 
located, an optimal global regulatory structure would exist. The 
beneficiaries of any given issuer disclosing at its optimal level would be 
concentrated within the area in which the issuer is located. The 
governmental unit associated with this area, which we have assumed to be 
responsive, would have full incentives to set the level of disclosure at this 
level. 
The disclosure level of issuers located outside a given area will have no 
effect on the welfare of the area’s residents, even when shares of these 
outside issuers are purchased or traded by residents of the area or traded 
on exchanges located in the area. Thus, the fact that the governmental unit 
associated with the area will not regulate the level of disclosure of these 
outside issuers is of no matter to the residents of the area. Such a policy of 
forbearance also avoids conflicts with other governmental units. This is 
because any effort by the area’s government to regulate the disclosure of 
outside issuers will affect the welfare of residents of the territories in 
which the outside issuers are located without these residents being able to 
participate as citizens in the process by which the regulations are set. 
These conclusions hold over a wide range of assumptions concerning 
how global equity investing really is. We have assumed so far that equity 
investing is totally globalized and that investor location plays no role in 
who invests in which issuers. The conclusions hold at least as strongly, 
however, if global equity investing has not proceeded to the point where 
there is one global risk adjusted expected rate of return on capital. If 
investors exhibit some, or even a great deal of home bias, the 
concentration of benefits of good regulation at home is simply 
reinforced.25 
 
 
 25. To the extent that globalization has not yet proceeded far enough to result fully in a single 
global-risk-adjusted expected rate of return on capital, the remaining market segmentation simply 
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IV. AN OPTIMAL REGULATORY AREA: REAL WORLD CONSIDERATIONS 
Real world considerations make it impossible to find a set of regulatory 
areas that fit the ideal assumed in Part III. This can be seen by considering 
an extreme example. Imagine first that there is only one regulatory area: 
the whole world. In this “division” of the world, some of the assumptions 
employed in Part III—most trade being within the area, low mobility of 
labor and entrepreneurs to outside the area, and all issuers operating within 
the area having their economic centers of gravity there—can be met 
perfectly. The remaining assumptions—the governmental unit associated 
with the regulatory area being responsive to the needs of the residents of 
the area and capable of effective application and enforcement of its rules, 
and all issuers having the same optimal level of disclosure—would, 
however, be wildly off the mark. Now imagine that we subdivide the 
world into smaller regulatory areas. As we make the regulatory areas 
smaller, the failure of this second set of assumptions is likely to become 
less severe. Problems begin to arise, however, with the first set of 
assumptions: there will be too much cross-border trade, too much factor 
mobility across area lines, and too many issuers with no clear economic 
center of gravity. Thus, whatever the chosen set of regulatory areas, at 
least some of Part III’s five assumptions will not be met. 
This Part examines the implications of this breakdown in assumptions. 
This examination has two functions. First, it helps identify where the 
optimal point of tradeoff is between the advantages of larger sized areas 
 
 
reinforces the point that the gains from an area’s issuers disclosing at their optimal levels will be 
concentrated at home. An area whose issuers disclose at the optimal level of disclosure will have 
capital-utilizing enterprises that produce higher returns net of costs of disclosure. If the single-rate 
assumption is correct, the gains from getting the disclosure level right will primarily be enjoyed by the 
less mobile claimants on these returns, domestic entrepreneurs, and labor, not by the suppliers of 
capital, who, wherever in the world they live, will at best enjoy a slight increase in the overall global 
expected return on capital. See supra note 19. If the assumption is incorrect, the reason would be that 
each area’s investors still have a degree of bias against issuers from other areas. In that event, U.S. 
investors, for example, might share disproportionately in the gains from moving the U.S. issuer 
disclosure level toward its optimal level. The bias of foreign investors against U.S. issuers would mean 
that the increase in the number of expected dollars of future cash flow resulting from the change in 
required disclosure would be offered to a somewhat restricted market and push the price for them 
down more for U.S. investors than for other investors. Id. To the extent that a U.S. issuer has U.S. 
shareholders, the fact that U.S. investors will share disproportionately in the gains from optimal 
disclosure simply creates an additional U.S. interest in the level of the issuer’s disclosure. As for U.S. 
issuers whose shares are sold to and traded among only foreign investors, entrepreneurs and labor in 
the United States would, just as if there were a single global expected rate of return on capital, enjoy 
most of the gains from optimal disclosure. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 6, 
at 2561-69. Thus, in this example, the United States interest in the disclosure behavior of this second 
set of issuers would be as strong as it is shown to be under the assumption in the text. 
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and the advantages of smaller sized areas under various circumstances 
prevailing in different parts of the world. Second, it reveals that the 
breakdown of the assumptions, while making the world a messy place 
with no ideal solution to its division into regulatory areas, does not 
resurrect the case for using investor location or transaction location as the 
territorial tie to determine which government regulates which issuer, nor 
does it resurrect the case for issuer choice. 
A. Assumptions that Fail as the Regulatory Areas Grow Smaller 
1. Trans-Border Trade 
The smaller a regulatory area, the greater the likelihood that there will 
be a substantial amount of trans-border trade. This creates problems even 
if labor and entrepreneurs are still relatively immobile. With substantial 
trans-border trade, many of the issuers located in a given area will count 
among their competitors, and major suppliers and customers, issuers 
located outside the area.  
The existence of these out-of-area competitors, major suppliers, and 
major customers biases the area’s government downward when it 
compares requiring a higher level of disclosure to a lower one. The 
government knows that if it chooses the higher level, each of the area’s 
issuers will both suffer costs and enjoy benefits. The issuer will suffer the 
costs associated with all of its competitors, major suppliers, and major 
customers finding out the additional required information. This is so 
whether the competitors, suppliers, or customers are located inside or 
outside the area. The issuer will benefit, however, from finding out the 
additional required information only from its competitors, major suppliers, 
and major customers that are located inside the area, and hence subject to 
the higher disclosure requirement. The area’s issuers’ competitors, major 
suppliers, and major customers located outside the area are the ones who 
enjoy the rest of the benefits from the higher level of disclosure. Thus, 
there is a trans-border externality associated with the national 
government’s decision setting the level of disclosure for its issuers. The 
government will choose the level that will maximize the welfare of its 
residents. The government will not account for the portion of the benefits 
from additional disclosure that would be enjoyed by its issuers’ foreign 
competitors, major suppliers, and major customers, just for the costs to its 
issuers of these outsiders learning the information. 
Utilizing a larger regulatory area corresponding to a higher level of 
government reduces or eliminates this bias by internalizing some or all of 
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these information externalities,26 but doing so will entail the disadvantages 
of larger regulatory areas discussed below. This dilemma cannot be 
resolved by utilizing a smaller area but choosing investor nationality or 
transaction location as a territorial tie instead of issuer location. While 
choosing such ties would subject some issuers outside the area to 
regulation by the area’s government, the set of outside issuers that would 
be regulated would bear no systematic relation to the ones whose 
disclosure levels affect the welfare of persons within the area. This is 
because regulation would be the result of an outside issuer having 
investors residing within the area or trades in its shares occurring on the 
area’s exchanges. It would not be because of the outside issuer’s status as 
a competitor, major supplier, or major customer of issuers located within 
the area. 
The dilemma would also not be resolved by combining a smaller 
regulatory area with issuer choice. Because of the downward bias caused 
by trans-border information externalities, regulation based on issuer 
location only partially, not fully, corrects for the market failure caused by 
the overall information externalities that justify regulation in the first 
place.27 With issuer choice, this market failure would not be corrected at 
all.28 
2. Factor Mobility 
The smaller the regulatory area, the greater the likelihood that there 
will be significant mobility in labor and entrepreneurial talent across the 
area’s borders. The greater this mobility, the more the returns to labor and 
entrepreneurs residing within the regulatory area will be affected by the 
demand for them outside the regulatory area. In essence, the greater the 
mobility the more that the effective market for these factors can be seen as 
covering a territory larger than the regulatory area.  
Because the returns to labor and entrepreneurs residing within the 
regulatory area are affected by demand outside the regulatory area, the 
 
 
 26. I discuss these points in more detail elsewhere. See, Political Economy, supra note 6, at 747-
49, 762-64. 
 27. See supra Part I.B. 
 28. See supra Part III.E. Ed Kitch and Stephen Choi have each expressed the concern that the 
issuer location approach is undermined by these trans-border externalities. Edmund W. Kitch, 
Proposals for Reform of Securities Regulation: An Overview, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 629, 651 (2001); 
Stephen J. Choi, Assessing Regulatory Responses to Securities Market Globalization, 2 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES IN L. 613, 646 (2001). They are in a sense correct, but they do not follow through to see its 
ultimate implications. The defect in my approach is that the system would only partially correct for a 
market failure that their issuer choice approach would not correct at all.  
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benefits from regulation that prompts issuers located within the area to 
disclose at their optimal level are deconcentrated. Entrepreneurs and labor 
residing outside the area enjoy some of the benefit because of increased 
demand due to the more efficient utilization of capital by issuers within 
the area. At the same time, where issuers located outside the area are not 
subject to regulation that prompts them to disclose at their optimal levels, 
the returns to entrepreneurs and labor residing inside the area are lower 
than they otherwise would be. 
This deconcentration of the benefits reduces the political incentive for 
the government associated with the regulatory area to undertake good 
regulation. This effect, however, is different, and less pernicious, than the 
downward bias caused by cross-border trade. The government still does 
best by its residents by setting the required level of disclosure equal to the 
socially optimal level of the issuers located within its area. The gain for 
doing so, however, is less, and so other matters are more likely to take 
political priority. Thus, there is less likelihood that the government will 
make the full effort needed to get the disclosure level right.  
This problem created by the breakdown of the labor and 
entrepreneurial talent assumptions would not be solved by utilizing 
investor nationality or transaction location instead of issuer location as the 
territorial tie. This is because the set of outside issuers that would be 
subject to the area’s disclosure regulation under these approaches would 
bear no systematic relation to the ones whose disclosure levels would 
affect demand for entrepreneurial talent and labor residing within the area. 
Nor would the problem be solved by issuer choice. Again, issuer choice 
fails to address in the first place the market failure that prompts the need 
for regulation to correct what would otherwise be a suboptimal level of 
disclosure. The failure of the low mobility assumption simply means that 
the global regulatory structure will not be as fully effective at correcting 
this market failure as would otherwise be the case. 
3. Issuers with No Clear Economic Center of Gravity 
The smaller the regulatory areas, the more issuers in the world will 
have no clear economic center of gravity. This breaks down the 
assumption that every issuer has a clear economic center of gravity in one 
regulatory area or another. The consequences of this breakdown are very 
similar to those of the breakdown of the assumption of no significant labor 
and entrepreneurial talent mobility.  
The benefits from an issuer with no clear economic center of gravity 
disclosing at its optimal level are experienced in significant part by 
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persons residing in more than one area. If the issuer is regulated by a 
government associated with one of these areas, the benefits will be 
deconcentrated. This deconcentration reduces the political incentive for 
the government to undertake good regulation. In addition, even if the 
government does strive to regulate in a way that prompts its purely 
domestic issuers (i.e., issuers that clearly are located within the area) to 
disclose at their optimal level, the regulation is less likely to be right for 
the issuer with no clear center of gravity, which may well have a corporate 
governance arrangement that is different from most of the purely domestic 
issuers. A different corporate governance arrangement can imply a 
different (higher or lower) optimal level of disclosure.29 
If the disclosure of the issuer with no clear economic center of gravity 
is regulated by governments associated with more than one of these areas, 
compliance by the issuer with multiple sets of regulation can be costly in 
terms of real resources. Moreover, while regulation by multiple 
governments decreases the chance that the issuer will end up disclosing at 
a level below its optimal level, it increases the chance it will be required to 
disclose above its optimal level. 
Again, neither the investor location nor the transaction location 
approaches have features that would address these problems. Issuer choice 
would have the advantage of assuring that no issuer would be regulated by 
a jurisdiction that requires disclosure above its optimal level because no 
issuer would choose such a jurisdiction. However, because issuer choice 
does not correct the market failure that leads to the need for mandatory 
disclosure in the first place, it is likely to result in most issuers being 
regulated by jurisdictions that require disclosure below their optimal 
levels. 
B. Assumptions That Fail as the Regulatory Areas Grow Larger 
1. Responsive Government with Effective Enforcement  
The larger the regulatory area, the less likely it is that the governmental 
unit regulating it will be responsive to the needs of the residents of the 
area. This proposition reflects the ideas behind the concept of 
“subsidiarity,” specifically, that regulation should be undertaken by the 
lowest level of government capable of handling the task properly. Citizen 
access to governments serving large numbers of geographically dispersed 
 
 
 29. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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people is bound to be more difficult, everything else being equal. Also, 
while up to a point there may be economies of scale in terms of the 
resources necessary to develop a certain level of expertise on the part of 
government officials, beyond that point it is harder for government 
officials to be knowledgeable about the more diverse set of conditions 
likely to prevail in a regulatory area containing more people and a larger 
amount of territory.  
These problems become most extreme when regulation is undertaken 
by some kind of multinational entity. Current political realities mean that 
national governments and trans-national bureaucracies each need to play a 
large role in the governance of such entities if they are to have any 
meaningful influence. These intricacies lead to concerns about the 
“democratic deficit” that critics claim is displayed by multinational bodies 
such as the European Community and the World Trade Organization. Such 
multinational entities are also likely to have particularly great problems 
effectively enforcing their rules. Even when they have their own 
enforcement authorities and institutions to apply their rules to specific 
cases, they are likely to require use of the legal systems of their member 
states to impose any effective sanctions on persons they find to have 
violated these rules. 
2. Issuers Having the Same Optimal Level of Disclosure 
The larger the regulatory areas, the more likely it is that the assumption 
that all issuers have the same socially optimal level of disclosure will 
break down significantly. There are important differences among issuers 
worldwide in terms of the level of disclosure that will maximize returns, 
net of the costs of this disclosure, that the issuers’ capital utilizing 
productive activities generate. These differences in the issuers’ socially 
optimal disclosure levels are significantly related to where the issuers are 
located. This is because differences in optimal disclosure levels arise out 
of differences in corporate governance arrangements, which vary in 
different parts of the world. Disclosure is of more value, for example, in a 
market-centered economy than in a bank-centered economy, and therefore, 
despite the higher costs of greater disclosure, issuers in a market-centered 
economy will tend to have a higher socially optimal level of disclosure.30 
A single mandated disclosure level covering the issuers located in a larger 
 
 
 30. See Political Economy, supra note 6, at 758-60; Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in 
Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 237-53 
(1998). 
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regulatory area will, therefore, be further away on average from each 
individual issuer’s socially optimal disclosure level. 
Neither the investor location nor transaction location approaches have 
features that would address these problems. Each of these approaches 
would lead, for some issuers within a larger regulatory area, to their 
disclosure being regulated by a government outside the area. There would 
be no systematic relation, however, between the issuers subject under 
these approaches to an outside government’s regulatory regime and the 
issuers within the area that had socially optimal disclosure levels 
particularly far from that of the average issuer in the area. Again, relative 
to a larger regulatory area with issuer location as the territorial tie, issuer 
choice would have the benefit of assuring that no issuer would be 
regulated by a jurisdiction requiring disclosure above the issuer’s optimal 
level. However, issuer choice is likely to result in most issuers being 
regulated by jurisdictions requiring disclosure below their optimal levels. 
V. CONCLUSION: APPLICATIONS 
The choice of regulatory area for securities disclosure is, as noted in 
the introduction, a hot issue today around the world. The United States, 
which decided in the 1930s to move from an exclusively state-based 
system to one primarily relying on federal regulation, is being urged by the 
proponents of issuer choice to reconsider and give issuers the option to 
choose among a reinvigorated set of state regulatory regimes.31 Canada is 
currently debating whether to enlarge the role of the federal government in 
a system that has traditionally left disclosure regulation primarily to the 
provinces, a switch undertaken by Australia in the 1980s.32 The countries 
of Europe are also deciding the extent to which the European Community, 
rather than its member states, should determine securities disclosure in 
Europe.33 Of the participants in the Canadian and European debates who 
urge that provincial or state-level regulation be maintained, some simply 
seek to maintain the status quo. Others are proposing at the same time 
changes that would convert the regulatory structures for Canada and 
Europe into de facto issuer-choice systems.34 There are also calls for 
making the whole world a single regulatory area where uniform standards 
 
 
 31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 32. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 33. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 34. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 2, at 84-86. 
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are set for issuers around the world either by a multinational entity or 
through harmonization of state-level requirements.35  
The theory of optimal regulatory areas set out here establishes a 
framework for analyzing all of these debates. While more definitive 
answers would require in-depth research concerning the specific features 
of each of the situations, application of certain commonly known facts is 
at least suggestive of the proper outcomes. 
A. The United States and Canada 
1. The United States 
Putting issuer choice aside for a moment, there seems to be no case for 
returning the United States to a state-based regulatory structure. A large 
percentage of trade in goods and services in each state is with persons 
outside the state. There is sufficient mobility of labor and entrepreneurial 
talent between states that the market for them has a substantial national 
component. There is no strong evidence that state regulators would be 
significantly more responsive to the needs of their residents in the area of 
disclosure regulation than would be federal authorities. In the typical state, 
much of the economic activity is undertaken by issuers that cannot be 
characterized as having their economic center of gravity in the state. 
Whatever variation exists in the corporate governance structures of issuers 
across the country, little of it is geographically related. Thus, there is no 
reason to believe that issuers from one state would on average have a 
different optimal level of disclosure than issuers from another state.  
A reinvigoration of state disclosure regulation would be called for if 
the United States were to adopt issuer choice. As we have seen, however, 
the economic efficiency case for mandatory disclosure is based on the 
market failure that arises from each issuer’s private benefits from 
disclosure being less than the social benefits and its private costs being 
higher than the social costs. These divergences result in unregulated 
issuers disclosing at a level below their social optimum. Issuer choice does 
not correct this failure. Thus, issuer choice cannot be justified on 
economic efficiency grounds unless the regulations adopted by the federal 
government have caused issuers to deviate even more (just in the opposite 
direction) from their optimal disclosure levels than issuer choice would. I 
 
 
 35. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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have argued elsewhere that the proponents of issuer choice have not made 
a persuasive argument that this is the case.36 
2. Canada 
The economic efficiency case for Canada to be a single regulatory area 
is strong, though not as strong as for the United States. Quebec and the 
western provinces may be more economically separate and distinct in their 
corporate governance arrangements from the rest of the country than is the 
case with any of the regions of the United States. Still, the overall situation 
in Canada seems close to that of the United States. There is a great deal of 
trade between provinces and much mobility of labor and entrepreneurial 
talent across provincial lines. Many corporations have significant 
operations across the country or at least in multiple provinces. The federal 
government appears reasonably responsive and effective in its 
enforcement capabilities. Beyond the distinctive features of some issuers 
in Quebec and the western provinces, any corporate governance 
differences among the country’s issuers do not appear to be highly 
correlated with geography.  
A driving force behind reform is the inconvenience of the current 
regulatory structure whereby the provinces are the regulatory areas, and 
investor location and transaction location are used in part as rules of 
territorial tie. This can force issuers to comply with multiple disclosure 
regimes in order to participate in the national capital market. One solution 
to this problem is to move to a single large national regulatory area, as 
suggested here. Other solutions are to maintain the provinces as the 
regulatory areas but either to adopt issuer location as the sole rule of 
territorial tie or to adopt issuer choice.  
Each of these alternative solutions would be as good as national 
regulation for eliminating the costly need to comply with multiple 
regimes. The theory of optimal regulatory areas developed here, however, 
suggests that national regulation is superior to provincial regulation with 
issuer location as the sole territorial tie. The other alternative, issuer 
choice, cannot correct the market failures that lead unregulated issuers to 
disclose at a level below what is socially optimal. As previously noted, 
issuer choice thus cannot be justified on economic efficiency grounds 
unless the regulations that can be expected to be adopted by the Canadian 
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federal government would cause issuers to deviate even more from their 
optimal disclosure levels than would issuer choice. 
These potential problems with issuer choice are important to note. One 
possible route that reform could take would be to retain the provinces as 
the regulatory areas and to use issuer location to be the rule of territorial 
tie, but to equate an issuer’s location with the issuer’s place of 
incorporation rather than with its economic center of gravity. This sort of 
arrangement would establish a de facto regime of issuer choice. An issuer 
could choose for its place of incorporation or reincorporation the province 
that has the disclosure rules it most prefers and then go on to do business 
anywhere in Canada.  
3. A Single Combined Regulatory Area 
This discussion of the United States and Canada can be concluded with 
a provocative thought. A consideration of the five factors that need to be 
traded off in the construction of optimal disclosure areas suggests that 
perhaps the United States and Canada should be combined into a single 
regulatory area. The two economies are highly integrated with free trade 
and significant mobility of labor and entrepreneurial talent between the 
two. Their corporate governance systems are relatively similar. 
Establishing a responsive and effective regulatory entity might be difficult, 
but the closest substitute, harmonization of disclosure requirements, might 
be quite possible. Indeed, significant steps have already been taken in this 
regard. In 1991, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“SEC”) adopted rules and forms implementing the Canadian multi-
jurisdictional disclosure system, under which substantial Canadian issuers 
could offer securities in the United States based primarily on their 
Canadian disclosure filings.37 The negotiations between the SEC and the 
various Canadian provincial securities commissioners leading up 
implementation of the system resulted in the major provinces adding 
requirements that resembled what was already required in the United 
States, suggesting a certain kind of harmonization.38 
 
 
 37. Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting 
System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-6902, 49 SEC Docket 260 (June 21, 
1991). The issuers are required, however, to provide a reconciliation between the published accounts 
and U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. They are subject to the U.S. liability system. 
 38. See EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND 
DERIVATIVES MARKET § 8.01 n.1 (3d ed. 1996). 
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B. Europe 
The countries of Europe are also currently deciding the extent to which 
the European Community, rather than its member states, should determine 
securities disclosure in Europe.39 It is a close question whether there 
should be a single regulatory area encompassing the whole Community or 
multiple regulatory areas corresponding with the member states. While a 
much more detailed exploration is required to come to any definitive 
conclusions, several features of the situation stand out. 
While the ambition of the Community is to have a highly integrated 
economy with large amounts of cross border trade and high mobility of 
labor and entrepreneurial talent, the reality may lag behind. Overall, the 
level of economic integration appears not to be as great as in the United 
States or Canada, particularly with respect to the portion of the 
Community’s territory constituting the new members. On the other hand, 
there appears to be far more integration among the member states than 
among the regulatory areas in the ideal case discussed in Part III or even, 
as a general matter, between member states and countries outside the 
Community.  
Compared to Canada or the United States, the European Community 
displays considerable more diversity in corporate governance 
arrangements. Thus, the U.K.’s market-centered corporate governance 
looks quite different than Germany’s bank-centered one. Italy, with its 
domination by family companies and relatively low protections for 
minority shareholders, looks quite different from either of the other two.  
The Community-level governmental institutions, with the continuing 
large role played by member states and the central bureaucracy, may be 
substantially less responsive to the needs of its residents than most of 
member states’ governments, whose top officials are chosen pursuant to 
direct democratic elections.  
In sum, there are no simple answers to the question of the optimal 
regulatory area or areas for Europe. The underlying level of economic 
integration provides substantial arguments for a single regulatory area. 
The level of trade is sufficiently high to cause the kind of information 
externalities that would result in a significant downward bias in the level 
of disclosure that a member state is likely to require of its issuers. There is 
also enough labor and entrepreneurial talent mobility to reduce the 
incentives of member state governments to try to get the regulations right. 
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On the other hand, the institutional factors argue the other way. The very 
large differences among countries in corporate governance arrangements 
suggest that their issuers have considerably different optimal levels of 
disclosure. And the bureaucracy in Brussels that would be operating a 
Community-wide regime appears to be the subject of considerable 
resentment for its lack of responsiveness.  
C. A Single Global Regulatory Area 
The theory of optimal regulatory areas developed here strongly argues 
against a single global regulatory area, at least for all but the truly 
multinational issuers such as Daimler-Chrysler and BP-Amoco. Despite all 
the talk of globalization, we fall short today of having a truly integrated 
global economy.40 This suggests that while cross-border mobility of trade, 
labor and entrepreneurial talent, and the existence of issuers with no clear 
economic center of gravity cause substantial problems when we use 
countries or regional economic communities as the regulatory areas rather 
than the globe as a whole, these problems are not so large as to completely 
vitiate the logic set out in the ideal case in Part III.  
As noted above, problems relating institutional factors raise serious 
questions concerning the desirability of a single European regulatory area. 
Such problems are far more grave when we contemplate the whole globe 
being a single regulatory area. Setting up from scratch a responsive, 
effective multinational body to administer such a system would be a 
daunting task. Moreover, unlike with a nationally based system, dealings 
between the entrepreneurs or managers of the issuers and the officials 
regulating them would often not be between persons who share a common 
culture, language, and understanding of business practices. Finally, there 
are wide differences in corporate governance arrangements around the 
world that involve additional dimensions even beyond what we have seen 
in the comparison of the U.K., Germany, and Italy. 
In sum, the degree of world economic integration is not so complete as 
to vitiate the logic of national regulation and compel movement to a single 
regime. And the institutional factors argue strongly against such a move. 
 
 
 40. Most of the world’s issuers, even ones labeled “multinational,” for example, still have a 
distinct nationality of this sort in some country (particularly if the E.C. is for these purposes treated as 
a single country). In 1990, profits from foreign operations of U.S. corporations amounted to only about 
one-sixth of all corporate profits. See NIPA Table 6.16C, 72 SURV. CURRENT BUS. No. 12 at 14 
(1992). In 1989, overseas assets of even U.S. corporations designated as “multinational” were only 
about one-fifth of their total assets. See Jeffrey H. Lowe & Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad: 1989 Benchmark Survey Results, 71 SURV. CURRENT BUS. 29 tbl.2 (Oct. 1991).  
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